How disinformation threatens Wisconsin's democracy
Coordinated campaigns, including foreign and domestic actors, are using bots, trolls and fake accounts to target voters, institutions and public trust
In Wisconsin, where very narrow margins often decide elections, coordinated disinformation campaigns are quietly influencing public perception and testing the resilience of democracy itself. The state’s competitive political environment makes it a frequent focus for manipulation, division, and erosion of confidence in civic institutions. Federal intelligence and security agencies, including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland Security, and the FBI, warn that closely contested states are particularly vulnerable to influence operations.
Even modest shifts in perception – not just votes alone – can have meaningful consequences, drawing attention from both domestic and foreign actors. Researchers at the Stanford Internet Observatory and the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab note that these campaigns are deliberately crafted to appear authentic, tailored to resonate across urban, suburban, and rural communities, while reinforcing a common theme: distrust of institutions, elections, and one another.
The architects of influence and how they operate
Federal cybersecurity officials and academic researchers identify the architects of these operations as “Orderers of Disinformation” – foreign state actors and strategic competitors seeking to manipulate public perception. These actors hire content creators to develop realistic-looking news sites, social media accounts, and videos designed to appear authentic to local communities. Bots, cyborgs, trolls, troll farms, and sockpuppets amplify the content, while ordinary users who share it unknowingly act as further multipliers. Public intelligence assessments indicate that Russian troll farms have repeatedly targeted swing states, including Wisconsin, and researchers also identify state-linked actors from Iran, China, and other nations conducting coordinated campaigns. Their primary goal is not necessarily to change votes but to erode trust in elections, civic institutions, and public confidence, creating long-term vulnerabilities in democracy.
Modern campaigns rely on hybrid approaches, combining automated bots, human-run accounts, coordinated troll farms, and hire-for-service operations – a tactic described by scholars at the Oxford Internet Institute and Columbia University as computational propaganda. Multiple accounts pushing the same narrative across platforms make false content appear credible. While machine learning and network analysis can detect patterns of coordination, human analytical judgment remains essential to avoid misidentifying threats or missing subtle campaigns.

Propaganda masquerading as local voices
Disinformation often spreads through accounts posing as neighbors, parents, veterans, faith leaders, or local activists. Research from the Election Integrity Partnership, a consortium of Stanford University and other academic institutions, has documented networks of imitation accounts, fake local pages, and synthetic personas posing as trusted voices. Social media algorithms reward engagement over accuracy, amplifying emotionally charged posts that provoke fear, resentment, or outrage, creating the appearance of grassroots consensus.
The objective of these operations is destabilization rather than persuasion. Guidance from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency notes that influence campaigns deliberately target trust in civic institutions, seeking to weaken social cohesion and discourage participation. In Wisconsin, election workers, journalists, and civically engaged residents report navigating harassment and misleading narratives regularly. State officials, including the Wisconsin Department of Justice, emphasize that threats or intimidation of election workers are criminal acts that undermine election administration and democratic participation.
Consequences for civic life: Harassment, attrition, and exploiting uncertainty
Harassment and intimidation have tangible effects on local elections. Poll worker volunteer attrition increases operational strain during elections. In some communities, law enforcement presence is required at public meetings to maintain order. Coordinated campaigns exploit comment sections, online forums, and social media groups to reinforce false narratives and intimidate dissenting voices – a pattern documented nationally and observed locally by Wisconsin journalists, election officials, and civic leaders.
Disinformation thrives where uncertainty exists. Administrative errors, unresolved legal disputes, and complex election procedures provide material for misleading claims. Public reports from the Wisconsin Elections Commission have identified isolated issues in absentee ballot handling and election administration. While limited in scope, these incidents are often misrepresented online as evidence of systemic dysfunction. Ongoing litigation over congressional district maps has similarly generated uncertainty that disinformation actors exploit. In response, state and local officials have reviewed poll-watcher rules and considered additional protections for election staff.


Ordinary citizens as amplifiers
Influence operations often rely on ordinary Americans as unwitting distribution channels. Studies show that podcasters, local commentators, and hyper-partisan voices may repeat misleading narratives believing them to be accurate. Even well-intentioned citizens can inadvertently spread disinformation when court rulings, administrative reviews, or election-related errors are shared without context. The result is a feedback loop in which manufactured narratives gain legitimacy through repetition.
Federal intelligence and academic research confirm that foreign actors continue targeting U.S. voters through coordinated online campaigns. Recurring patterns include synchronized posting behavior, reused talking points, and deployment of synthetic personas. Wisconsin’s swing-state status, highly engaged electorate, and diverse media ecosystem increase its exposure to these tactics. Local journalists, election officials, and civic organizations encounter the effects firsthand, underscoring that the threat is ongoing, measurable, and real.
Erosion of trust and vigilance
Harassment and intimidation of election workers strain resources and discourage civic participation. Communities exposed to sustained disinformation experience erosion of trust, heightened polarization, and declining confidence in transparent institutions. As trust weakens, public engagement suffers, leaving democratic processes more vulnerable to disruption.
Election security researchers, public agencies, and military cybersecurity officials emphasize that defending against disinformation requires collective vigilance. Verifying sources, questioning emotionally provocative content, and considering who benefits from its spread can significantly reduce the reach of manipulated narratives. Protecting democratic processes depends on secure systems and informed, engaged citizens.

Local action as democracy’s defense
Wisconsin residents play a decisive role in sustaining democratic resilience. Informed voters, cautious sharers, and engaged community members strengthen civic culture, support local journalism, and resist the amplification of fear and falsehood. As administrative reviews continue and legal questions remain unresolved, local engagement is essential to preventing disinformation from translating into real-world harm. The vigilance of Wisconsinites will help determine not only the state’s democratic future but the integrity of public trust itself.
How disinformation threatens Wisconsin's democracy © 2026 by Jean Kiernan Detjen is licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0